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TRANSATLANTIC FREE TRADE: WINNERS,
LOSERS AND NECESSARY
ACCOMPANYING MEASURESt
Prof Gabriel Felbermayr, Ph.D., Benedikt Heid, and Sybille Lehwald*

THIS

I.

INTRODUCTION

study is devoted to the macroeconomic effects of a Transat-

lantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TIIP) between the European Union and the United States. For this purpose, empirical
models of the world economy were used to clarify two essential scenarios:
(i) the elimination of tariffs in trade between the EU and the United
States, and (ii) a liberalization that goes far beyond just eliminating tariffs
at a scale that can be measured for comparable and actually existing freetrade agreements. Our approach differs from the traditional way of dealing with the subject in that the comprehensive scenario (ii) is defined
using measurable experience with similar agreements, not guesses about
what is considered politically possible. Our results thus show potentials
against which the success of the agreement can be measured ex post
facto.
The approach used in this first part of the study is macroeconomic in
nature, meaning that the analysis uses aggregated data by country. It
looks at the changes in worldwide trade flows, real per capita income, and
unemployment. In so doing, it identifies countries that would gain from
TTIP and those that would lose. The second part of the study is
microeconomic in nature and examines the disaggregated effects in detail
for Germany. For example, estimates of the TTIP effect on individual
regions, industries, educational levels, and occupational groups are
presented.
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After a discussion of the methods used and a more detailed description
of the scenarios, we examine the TTIP effects on the structure of world
trade. We answer the questions "where does trade grow, where does it
shrink, and by how much?" We then turn our attention to TTIP effects
on real per capita income-i.e., per capita Gross Domestic Product
(GDP)-which enables global welfare effects to be quantified. Finally,
we report on the results of a model simulation that allows us to quantify
the effects on unemployment rates.
II. COMMENTS ON THE STUDY METHOD
To obtain reliable numbers for the GDP effect of a transatlantic freetrade agreement on all EU member states essentially requires (a) an appropriate theoretical model framework and (b) reasonable scenarios. For
this purpose, we use a computable general equilibrium model that was
developed at the ifo Institut to analyze the free-trade agreement.' The
fundamental innovation of the model is that it combines econometric and
simulation-based methods. This enables us to ensure that the trade costs,
whose reduction are the ultimate concern of every free-trade agreement,
are properly estimated and consistently applied when calculating measurements of welfare. To that end, observed real-world trade flows and
empirical proxies for the factors that determine trade costs are used. The
strength of the model lies in the fact that its basic scenario is exactly reproduced: This applies essentially to bilateral trade flows between a large
number of countries, real income, and unemployment rates. In the simulation of the liberalization scenarios, specific elements of the estimated
costs of trade are changed and the effects on trade flows, real income, and
unemployment are then calculated.
The approach differs from commercially available computer general
equilibrium (CGE) models frequently used to estimate the effects of
trade liberalization. In fact, most existing TTIP studies also use CGE
methods. 2 In such studies, trade costs are typically not estimated consist1. This model is explained in detail in Gabriel Felbermayr et al., Dimensions and
Impact of a Free Trade Agreement Between the EU and USA, Iwo INsTru'r (Jan.
2013), http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/research/Projects/Archive/Projects
AH/2013/projAHfreihandelUSA-GER.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2013).
2. This applies to the CGE studies on TIlP for Sweden, e.g. KOMMERSKOLLEGIUM
[NATIONAL BOARD OF TRADE (SWEDEN)], PotentialEffects from an EU-US Free
Trade Agreement-Sweden in Focus (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.kommers.se/Documents/In%20English/Reports/Potential%20Effects%20from%20an%20EU-US
%20Free%2OTrade%20Agreement%20-%20Sweden%20i%20Focus.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2013); Austria, e.g. Joseph Francois & Olga Pindyuk, Modeling the
Effects of Free Trade Agreements Between the EU and Canada, USA and Moldoval
Georgia/Armenia on the Austrian Economy: Model Simulations for Trade Policy
Analysis, FIW RESEARCii REPORTs 2012/13 (Jan. 2013), http://www.fiw.ac.at/

fileadmin/Documents/Publikationen/Studien_2012_13/03-Research Report-FrancoisPindyuk.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2013); and France, e.g. Lionel Fontagn6 &
Julien Gourdon, Evaluation of a Bilateral Trade Agreement TAFTA Between EU
and US (2013) (on file with CEPII, Paris).; and for the study by the European
Commission, Francois, et al., Reducing Trans-Atlantic Barriersto Trade and Investment (Mar. 2013), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/march/tradoc150737.
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ently from model to model. Other modeling differences consist in the
country breakdown and the treatment of unemployment. In our approach, we consider all countries for which bilateral trade data is available. There is no regional aggregation or it is only performed afterwards,
to better clarify the results. In many model variants, we also assume frictional unemployment, which arises from the explicit modeling of the job
search process by employees and employers. This modeling approach
was recognized in 2010 with the Nobel Prize and offers the advantage
that it reflects the most important characteristics of national labor market
institutions quite well.
On this basis, the initial equilibrium for 126 countries has been calibrated in such a way that the model reproduces the bilateral trade flows
observed in 2007 (before the economic crisis) between country pairs (our
database includes 15,750 such pairs) and all GDP statistics for that year.3
The model is also exactly "calibrated" for the reference year, and it includes not only the twenty-seven EU Member States but virtually all economically relevant countries in the world.
A further advantage of this structural economic method-i.e., one that
assumes an explicit economic theory-is that unlike the usual
econometric methods, which do not bother to have a grounded theoretical modeling (called reduced form estimates), it offers the possibility of
analyzing the consequences of a contrafactual implementation, such as a
TTIP agreement, before one actually takes place. This is made possible
by the additional structure of the underlying economic model. Reduced
form estimation generally allows retroactive analysis, i.e., after implementation, so that economic measures can only be designed afterwards,
in order to be able to react to specific partly negative accompanying affects that have already occurred. Finally, structural modeling allows
TTIP analysis without having to use a central assumption of almost all
reduced form estimates: that the general equilibrium effects can be considered ignorable. 4 That is why for agreements like TTIP, whose real
goal is to change the general equilibrium (change the trade flows between
all participating partners, raising welfare in the participating countries), it
is essential to use structural methods.
pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2013). These studies were frequently criticized in the past
because the ex ante forecasts regarding trade and welfare effects typically turned
out to be substantially too low in the ex post evaluation. Amr S. Hosny, Survey of
Recent Literature on CGE Trade Models: with Special Reference to the Case of
Egypt, J. WORLDn ECON. RESE-ARCH (Feb. 2013) describes the design of the regular

CGE models; Frank Ackerman, La valutazione degli effetti della liberalizzazione
commerciale: un esame critic [Assessing the Effects of Trade Liberalization:A Critical Examination], 3 RIVISTA DELiL'AssoCIAZONE Rossi-DORIA 7 (2006) offers

criticism.
3. Unfortunately the modeling of frictional unemployment is only possible for those
countries that have comparable data on unemployment rates and for regulating
labor markets; see also infra § VII (B).
4. This assumption is called SUTVA (Stable Unit Treatment Valve Assumption) in
economic literature. It is a component of the established reduced form methods,
which are applied to policy evaluation as standards.
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Understanding how to model bilateral trade costs is very important for
the discussion that follows in this study. The modern literature makes a
very clear and important point: tariffs and other trade-policy barriers, in
comparison to natural frictions like the sheer geographical distance between two trading parties, are of relatively small importance. 5 And the
quantitative role of tariff barriers in transatlantic trade is really negligible,
compared to other trade costs. 6 An exact measurement of existing trade
costs is, however, of great importance in calculating the effects of liberalization scenarios and it has been shown that the welfare gains from trade
liberalization are disproportionately higher if the trade costs are already
low in the initial equilibrium. 7
Figure 1 shows schematically how the trade costs between two countries can be allocated to individual categories. First there are the tariffs,
which, as already mentioned, play only a small role relative to the other
trade barriers. The remaining trade costs are then classified under the
heading "non-tariff" trade barriers. These include a large number of potentially very varied elements. First there are protectionist trade policy
measures, which make access to domestic markets more difficult for foreign suppliers. It includes such classic instruments as import quotas, but
also administrative and regulatory hurdles that discriminate against foreign firms. It can also include the necessity to obtain approval for products separately for both markets, done frequently by applying different
approval conditions and procedures; different standards to environmental, health, or consumer protection policy; different industry standards,
packaging regulations, and information requirements; regulating access to
public procurement or economic policy development programs, such as
government export credit insurance; and so on.

5. See Scott L. Baier & Jeffery H. Bergstrand, The Growth of World Trade: Tariffs,
Transport Costs, and Income Similarity, 53 J. INT'L ECON. 1, 1-27 (2001).
6. See, e.g. Gabriel Felbermayr et al., Icebergs Versus Tariffs: A Quantitative Perspective on the Gains from Trade (CESifo Working Paper No. 4175, 2013) available at
http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/working-papers/CESifoWP/
CESifoWPdetails?wp-num=4175&CESifoWP.search=+.
7. Id.
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Figure 1: Modeling trade costs. Schematic representation by ifo Institut.
Besides non-tariff barriers based on trade policy, there are additional
trade costs that, while politically induced, have nothing to do with trade
policy in the strict sense. For example, instruments of infrastructure, education, or labor market policy, or industrial policy measures can be used
to change trade costs. Some examples are the expansion of transportation options or the prominence of foreign languages in school curricula.
The last cost category in Figure 2 describes the so-called "natural" barriers. These are due to geographic distance, lack (or presence) of a common language, shared colonial past, common legal traditions, shared
currency, etc.
Empirically, all trade costs between 126 countries are estimated in such
a way that a trade flow equation (gravitation equation) is structurally derived from the simulation model that is used later. By determining trade
elasticities, the matrix of bilateral trade costs (126 countries times 126
countries) can be estimated. Together with multilateral trade cost variables and gross domestic production of the countries, this matrix replicates the expectation value of the trade actually observed between all
countries.
A detailed representation of the empirical model would overwhelm
this study. Instead, let us simply mention here that econometric estimation of the gravitation equation has made great progress in recent years,
including the ground-breaking work of Anderson and van Wincoop.8
They show that the trade costs within other pairs are important for making an accurate estimate of trade costs within a country pair. For example, how much geographical distance restrains trade between two
8. James E. Anderson & Eric van Wincoop, Trade Costs, 43 J. EcoN. LTTrnATURE

691 (2004).

450

LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 19

countries also depends on the average distance of these two countries
from their other trading partners. An additional problem, for which
there are now good solution methods, is the presence of country pairs in
which there is no trade. In the older literature, this was a problem. Egger and Felbermayr accordingly use non-linear methods for estimating
the gravitation equation.9 These econometric procedures also underlie
the estimates in this study. Finally, it is important to consider that trade
costs are themselves dependent on trade volumes. This applies especially
to the likelihood that a free-trade zone will be created between two specific countries. To obtain accurate estimates anyway, instrument variables have to be used. 10 The estimate then delivers two important results:
first, a matrix of trade costs between all country pairs and second, the
average effect of a free-trade zone on bilateral trade.
111.

TFIP-SCENARIOS

How does a free-trade agreement work in general, and a Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) in particular? Such agreements have a direct effect on trade costs between the two countries involved because they reduce the tariff barriers and certain non-tariff
barriers to trade. Because the scale of the effects depends on the related
macro-economic variables on which the amount of total trade costs are
dependent, it is important to estimate the underlying trade cost matrix
accurately. Indirect effects then result in the general equilibrium through
feedback from prices and income. The central issue in this context can be
stated this way: how is the trade cost matrix changed by TTIP?
We consider two scenarios:
* Tariff scenario: In this case, we assume that the trade cost matrix
described above is changed so that the trade costs between the
United States and European countries are reduced by the extent of
the tariffs now being applied in these bilateral relationships. Certain exceptions for special products may remain in force, but on
average, a reduction to zero or virtually zero for all goods seems
reasonable. The average tariff rate in transatlantic trade amounts
to about 3.5 percent.' That is how much trade costs between the
EU and United States are reduced in the tariff scenario, while trade
costs with other country pairs remain unaffected.
* Comprehensive liberalization scenario: In this case, we adapt the
trade cost matrix so that the resulting simulated change in trade
9. See generally, Peter Egger et al., The Trade Effects of Endogenous Preferential
Trade Agreements, 3 AM ECON. J.: ECON. POL. 113 (2011); see also Felbermayr et
al., supra note 1.
10. When trade costs are themselves driven by trade volumes, they cannot be treated
as "exogenous." This has implications for the econometric strategy. See, e.g., Egger, supra note 9.
11. Michael J. Geary, Global Europe Fellow, The Wilson Center, Presentation at The
Wilson Center (June 19, 2013) available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Geary-presentation.pdf.
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flows corresponds to the econometrically measured trade creation
from observed free-trade agreements.
The tariff scenario requires no additional description. The comprehensive liberalization scenario, on the other hand, is substantially more complex. The reduction of the stated barriers releases real resources that can
be used for useful activities, which result directly in welfare gains for the
economies affected. That applies regardless of how the non-tariff barriers
are ultimately reduced: by mutual recognition of different standards, by
harmonization or by elimination of measures that are purely discriminatory in nature.
In comparison with the comprehensive liberalization scenario, the
elimination of tariffs mainly means that the transfer of income from the
consumer to the state is reversed. While tariffs, besides having this distribution effect, also cause a loss of welfare, the loss is very low when the
tariffs are as low as they are in this case. 1 2
In order to distinguish our approach from other studies, look at Figure
2. This shows through the blank areas in which trade categories the transatlantic agreement will lead to a reduction of trade costs.
First, the import tariffs applied between the EU and United States will
disappear, just like in the tariff scenario. How can the change in nontariff barriers be modeled? There is a problem with this in the scientific
literature, because the definition and quantification of non-tariff barriers
continues to be disputed.13 One particular circumstance creates special
difficulties: even when it is possible to clearly distinguish non-tariff barriers from tariff barriers, it remains unclear which components of the nontariff barriers can in fact be influenced by free-trade agreements. In this
context, the literature speaks of "actionability" and seeks to identify
those barriers which, in the jungle of the most varied trade policy measures, can be changed in some circumstances. There is no systematic and
generally recognized way of doing that. In a second step, there must be a
way of clarifying the extent to which a free-trade agreement could lower
the non-tariff barriers. There is no recognized method of estimation for
this either; the studies use estimates by experts.
Our approach is different and avoids all speculation. From the gravitation equation that we are already using to quantify the trade cost matrix,
we obtain an econometric estimate for the trade creation effects of existing free-trade agreements, such as the European Union or the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). For all sectors and on average for all participating countries, the data show that the existing agreements increase trade in aggregate by about 80 percent. 14 This number
12. See generally Gabriel Felbermayr, et al., supra note 6.
13. See generally James E. Anderson & Yoto V. Yotov, The Changing Incidence of
Geography, 100 AM. ECON. Riv. 2157 (2010).
14. This value deviates from the one used in the industry analysis. This is due to the
choice of a larger aggregation level for macroeconomic consideration (the aggre-

gate value is not the same as the average of the industry values) and is based on a
different econometric strategy (solving the "endogeneity problem").
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reflects the status quo of 2007, but is stable over time. It reflects the fact
that trade agreements are not reached between random pairs of countries
or regions. Instead, the probability of having an agreement is higher if
there is already a relatively large amount of trade between a country
pair.' 5 In addition, it considers third-country effects, as well as trade creation that results indirectly from a change in the GDPs of all countries.

Trade Costs
Overall

Tariffs

Non-tariff
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Trade
Policy

Other
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"Natural"
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Figure 2: Change in trade costs from TTIP. Schematic representation by
ifo Institut.

The econometric estimate not only allows accurate parameterization of
a base equilibrium for a large number of countries, it also offers a reasonable scenario. The trade creation of 80 percent by already existing deep
agreements just mentioned in our view also represents a realistic order of
magnitude for the aggregate effect of a transatlantic free-trade agreement. It can again be concluded that mere elimination of the remaining
tariffs between the EU and the United States would never suffice to bring
about trade creation of this magnitude. Instead, the figures show that the
lion's share of trade creation must come from lowering non-tariff
barriers.
This can be understood using a simple example. In the gravitation
model, there is a partial analytic multiplier connection between the
change in bilateral trade and the change in all variable trade costs, in
which the multiplier is the elasticity of trade. If trade then increases by 80
15. It is possible that agreements are only signed if trade stimulation between two
countries is expected for reasons that have nothing to do with trade policy (e.g.,
economic growth). In that case, a positive correlation would exist between the
trade volume and the presence of an agreement, but it should not be interpreted as
a causal relationship. In this context, it is termed a "spurious" correlation.
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percent and trade elasticity is 5,16 then trade costs must have fallen by 80
percent/5=16 percent. The tariffs outside the free-trade agreement
amount to 3.5 percent. That means that the non-tariff barriers must have
fallen by 16 percent -3.5 percent =12.5 percent.
While this example is naturally highly simplified, it nevertheless makes
clear that our approach requires no determination of the "actionability"
of barriers and no speculation on the scale of cost reductions. Instead, we
assume that TTIP will have approximately the same effects on trade costs
that other free-trade agreements have had. In that way, those effects that
are especially difficult to quantify are also taken into account, reflected
under the heading "other policies." Moreover, our scenario definition
reflects the fact that the stimulation of trade by reducing trade policy barriers leads to secondary and tertiary effects from greater public and private investment in further improvements in trade infrastructure.
The average trade-creating effect of free-trade agreements in our study
is measured at about 80 percent. This is substantially higher than calculated in other studies. 17 The difference is due mainly to the different scenario definition: because we base our deep liberalization scenario on the
measured effects in real data, our results are higher. Two other differences are also important, however; first, the focus on trade costs allows us
to reproduce the status quo of the initial equilibrium with a very terse
formulation of the demand side of the model. But because trade cost
changes contribute in a non-linear way to changes in trade flows, our
model is more reactive than others that achieve the resulting equilibrium
by fixing consumption weights specific to each country.1 8 Second, our
approach makes it possible to actually include 126 countries in the analysis. That means that we do not have to perform any regional aggregations
that assume a frictionless exchange of goods. For example, trade within
the EU is affected by trade costs in our method, which reflects reality.
This also results in a strong reaction by the models to transatlantic trade
liberalization.
In all scenarios, we adopt the following thought experiment. We know
the world as it is represented in the initial equilibrium in the data. Now
we adapt the trade flows in such a way that the trade costs between the
EU Member States and the United States decrease to the extent that the
trade gain so induced between the participating countries corresponds to
the empirically measured effect of already existing agreements. Because
these agreements have existed on average for quite a while, our approach
results in the simulated effects of TTIP reflecting the complete expression
of all direct and indirect effects.

16. See Anderson & van Wincoop, supra note 8 (providing an overview of estimates of
trade elasticity).
17. Compare to the studies mentioned infra § 2.
18. Using such weighting, the traditional models represent the trade flows observed.
In our approach, this is achieved by the trade cost matrix.
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In the simulation model used, there is a relatively simple connection
between the welfare gains of a country from the new agreement, the
changes in a country's openness in general and so-called trade elasticity.
The model follows current research in doing this. 19 To summarize, it can
be said that the greater the trade-creating effect of an agreement, the
more real per capita income rises; the greater the trade elasticity, the
more the new relative capacity for competing on price will change trade
flows but the lower the per capita income gains will be. The level of trade
elasticity actually reflects how easily the goods of different countries can
be substituted for each other. The easier the substitution, the less "valuable" international trade will be.
IV.

WHERE DOES TRADE GROW, WHERE DOES IT SHRINK,
AND BY HOW MUCH?

TTIP will lead to a noticeable change in global trade structure. We
assume in our ambitious scenario that trade between the United States
and the EU Member States increases on average exactly to the extent we
have measured in the data on comparable existing agreements.
The intertwining of countries through trade is an important indicator of
cooperation, not only in trade policy but also in many other political areas. For example, a weakening of the trade relationships among EU
Member States could be considered critical because it could diminish the
interest of individual countries in the European unification project.
A.

EFFECTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN TRADE

Table 1 shows the calculated rates of change of bilateral trade volumes
and its most important trading partners in Europe and the world. The
figures indicate how trade volumes would appear in comparison with actually observed volumes if there had already been an agreement between
the EU and United States in 2010. We are thus comparing the factual,
observed reality of 2010 with a counterfactual reality in which we assume
that the agreement already existed. By doing so we avoid having to propose forecasts of future trade volumes (i.e., quantities and prices), which
would be associated with forecasting errors. And we avoid modeling specific phase-in paths, because doing so would also be extremely
speculative.
The first line of Table 1 shows that in the tariff scenario, German exports to the United States would rise by 1.13 percent and imports by 1.65
percent. That means that Germany's trade surplus of about USD 30 billion would decline slightly. Looking at the deep liberalization scenario
instead, exports and imports show very similar adaptations that in each
case are more than 90 percent. We find as a result a strong increase in
19. See Costas Arkolakis et al., New Trade Models, Same Old Gains?, 102 AM. ECON.
R. 94 (2012) (presenting a simple formula that can be used to quantify the trade
gains and has minimal information requirements).
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trade flows between Germany and the United States. This strong growth
should be understood in the context of the assumed scenarios. As explained above, it includes both the elimination of tariffs and the reduction
of non-tariff barriers that can be directly influenced by policy as well as
those which result from the effects of lowering political barriers on other
trade-creating variables, such as direct investments.
The Germany-U.S. example shows quite clearly that an agreement that
results only in lowering tariffs cannot trigger any significant trade-creating effects. On the other hand, a comprehensive and deep agreement has
much stronger effects.
Exporter
GER
USA

Importer
USA

2010 Trade volumes
(in USD millions)
83,553

Comprehensive
liberalization %
93.54

Tariff
scenario %
1.13

GER

51,645

93.56

1.65

GER
GBR
72,052
-40.91
-0.70
GBR
GER
43,583
-40.93
-0.57
GER
FRA
109,223
-23.34
-0.38
FRA
GER
76,518
-23.34
-0.24
GER
ITA
74,245
-29.45
-0.37
ITA
GER
52,687
-29.45
-0.55
GER
JPN
17,487
4.81
2.40
JPN
GER
24,891
4.76
-1.68
GER
CHN
67,728
-12.68
2.19
CHN
GER
92,536
-12.71
-2.94
Table 1: Change in German foreign trade with traditional partner countries.
Source: ifo Institut. GER: Germany, GBR: Great Britain, FRA: France, ITA: Italy,
JPN: Japan, CHN: China.
Table 1 also shows very forcefully that Germany's trade with its other
trading partners could decline sharply in some areas. The portents of
these trade effects are consistently negative in both the tariff and comprehensive liberalization scenarios. In principle, TTIP would significantly alter the trade diversion effects currently in force in the EU. Such
alterations occurred in the past because trade among the EU Member
States themselves is barrier-free, while trade by the EU Member States
with the United States is subject to both tariff and non-tariff barriers.
The leveling of the barriers with the United States thus leads to a decline
in trade that came about as a result of preferential treatment of intraEuropean trade flows. This is most true for Great Britain, which has relatively low natural trade barriers (language, culture) with the United
States, so that lowering policy friction leads to strong trade creation and
diversion.
Interestingly, TTIP leads to an expansion of Germany's exports to Japan, and does so in both assumed scenarios. This is related to the fact
that the competitiveness of German exporters is increased by the availability of cheaper intermediate products from the United States. Moreo-
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ver, there is a reduction of competitive pressure on the Japanese market
because its exports go back to the United States. The effect on Germany's trade with China is negative, however, at least in the deep liberalization scenario. A decline in both exports and imports of about 13
percent is to be expected in each case.
Next we examine German foreign trade with the GIIPS countries
(Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). This is of interest, given the
current crisis in the European Union. The data in Table 2 confirm what
was already evident in Table 1: the GIIPS countries are no exception-their trade with Germany will drop due to TTIP. The effects are
very small, if you look at the tariff scenario, but are substantial if the
more ambitious scenario is assumed.
Exporter

Importer

2010 Trade volumes
(in USD millions)

Comprehensive
liberalization %

Tariff
scenario %

GER
GRC

GRC
GER

6,655
2,322

-29.94
-29.93

-0.14
-0.95

GER
IRL

IRL
GER

5,195
10,662

-34.87
-34.85

-0.64
-0.16

GER
ITA

ITA
GER

74,245
52,687

-29.45
-29.45

-0.37
-0.55

-0.31
-29.9
10,306
PRT
-0.55
-29.88
5,385
GER
-0.47
-33.71
39,590
ESP
-0.57
-33.71
26,142
GER
-0.39
-30.96
135,991
GIIPS
-0.52
-31.22
97,197
GER
Table 2: Changes in German foreign trade with the peripheral EU (GIIPS).
Source: ifo Institut. GER: Germany, GRC: Greece, IRL: Ireland, ITA: Italy, PRT:
Portugal, ESP: Spain, GIIPS: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain.
GER
PRT
GER
ESP
GER
GIIPS

Finally, we consider the change in Germany's trade with the BRICS
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). As shown in

Table 3, the elimination of tariffs between the EU and United States
causes Germany's exports to the BRICS generally to rise slightly. The
reason lies in the increased price competitiveness of Germany due to
cheaper imports of intermediate products from the United States. Imports from the BRICS, on the other hand, decline because the competitive pressure in Germany increases from the intensified presence of
American companies. If a deep liberalization scenario is assumed, both
exports and imports undergo increased trade diversion: German exports
that previously went to the BRICS now go to the United States; and Germany replaces imports from the BRICS with imports from the United
States. This occurs even though the trade barriers with the BRICS have
not changed nominally. Trade diversion is driven solely by the change in
relative trade costs.
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Importer

2010 Trade volumes
(in USD millions)

Comprehensive
liberalization %

Tariff
scenario %

GER
BRA

BRA
GER

12,951
8,844

-7.58
-7.92

2.41
-3.67

GER
RUS

RUS
GER

32,512
20,362

-7.51
-7.17

1.64
-1.20

GER
IND

IND
GER

10,866
7,859

-8.96
-9.26

2.36
-2.30

GER
CHN

CHN
GER

67,728
92,536

-12.68
-12.71

2.19
-2.94

SAF
GER
BRICS
GER

8,274
6,719
132,331
136,320

-3.96
-3.73

1.24
-1.20

-10.06
-10.93

2.03
-2.61

Exporter

GER
SAF
GER
BRICS

Table 3: Change in German foreign trade with the BRICS countries. Source: ifo
Institut. GER: Germany, BRA: Brazil, CHN: China, RUS: Russia, IND: India,
SAF: South Africa, BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.
B.

EFFECTS ON

EU

TRADE

Next, we look at the change in EU trade with countries in their geographic vicinity. We look especially at the countries of the Maghreb, with
which the EU has a free-trade agreement (Euro-Mediterranean Agreement), and the two successor states to the Soviet Union for which we
have data (Russia and Belarus).
Table 4 shows that in the tariff scenario, EU exports to the countries
bordering the Mediterranean (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt) or
the successor states to the Soviet Union would increase, while imports
from these countries would decrease. This in turn reflects the increased
competitiveness of European companies. If the comprehensive liberalization scenario is considered, however, traditional trade diversion effects
predominate: EU exports to and imports from the Maghreb countries or
Eastern Europe decline. Given the massive drop in barriers between the
EU and the United States in our scenario, the effects are not easily
predictable.
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Exporter
EU
MAR
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Importer
MAR
EU

2010 Trade volumes
(in USD millions)
18,028
11,775

Comprehensive
liberalization %
-5.14
-5.39

Tariff
scenario %
0.94
-0.38

1.33
-4.75
14,818
-0.82
-4.41
13,287
4.11
-4.33
21,656
-0.98
-0.98
28,641
1.35
-5.81
19,851
-0.15
-7.67
10,584
1.57
-7.83
109,586
RUS
-1.15
-7.75
195,846
EU
2.59
-5.91
8,641
BLR
-0.42
-14.34
7,662
EU
Table 4: Changes in EU trade with EU neighboring countries. Source: ifo Institut.
EU: European Union, MAR: Morocco, TUN: Tunisia, DZA: Algeria, EGY: Egypt,
RUS: Russia, BLR: Belarus.
EU
TUN
EU
DZA
EU
EGY
EU
RUS
EU
BLR

TUN
EU
DZA
EU
EGY
EU

We then show that trade by the GIIPS states with the United States
increases sharply in all cases. Table 5 shows this increase is especially
true with comprehensive liberalization. The growth rates, with the exception of Ireland where transatlantic trade is already highly developed, are
on the same scale as the rates for the bilateral relationship of the United
States with Germany.
Tariff
Comprehensive
scenario %
liberalization %
1.95
90.43
0.60
90.45
1.44
77.03
8,022
IRL
USA
1.40
77.06
28,424
USA
IRL
1.71
91.77
13,254
ITA
USA
1.00
91.75
28,151
USA
ITA
1.78
90.56
1,068
PRT
USA
1.01
90.59
2,053
USA
PRT
1.62
80.18
11,575
ESP
USA
0.99
80.16
8,724
USA
ESP
ifo
Source:
States.
the
United
with
countries
GIIPS
of
in
trade
Table 5: Change
Institut. GRC: Greece, IRL: Ireland, ITA: Italy, PRT: Portugal, ESP: Spain.
Exporter
USA
GRC

Importer
GRC
USA

2010 Trade volumes
(in USD millions)
1,559
917

Finally, we examine the change in the trade relationships of Great Britain. These trade relationships are of special interest because Great Britain, unlike other members of the European Union, already has a very
high degree of economic integration with the United States, and the new
definition of Great Britain's role in the EU is often discussed with reference to its strong relationships with the United States.
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Table 6 shows that in the case of a transatlantic agreement, both exports to the United States and imports by Great Britain from the United
States would grow sharply. This is especially evident for the comprehensive liberalization scenario. Trade with Canada would be only slightly
affected. In comparison, it appears that integration of Great Britain in
the EU would be noticeably weaker in some areas. In other words,
through the transatlantic agreement, having Great Britain remain in the
European Customs Union would be less valuable for both Great Britain
and the other EU Member States. Given this background, the discussion
of Great Britain's exit from the EU could take on additional energy.
2010 Trade volumes

Comprehensive

Tariff

Exporter
Importer
(in USD millions)
liberalization %
scenario %
GBR
USA
49,347
60.56
0.98
USA
GBR
42,184
60.61
1.38
GBR
CAN
9,400
-1.45
2.67
CAN
GBR
15,929
-1.41
-0.15
GBR
GER
43,583
-40.93
-0.57
GER
GBR
72,052
-40.91
-0.70
GBR
FRA
26,610
-36.41
-0.52
FRA
GBR
34,002
-36.39
-0.52
GBR
ITA
15,268
-41.47
-0.51
ITA
GBR
23,191
-41.46
-0.82
GBR
ESP
13,710
-45.01
-0.61
ESP
GBR
15,690
-45.00
-0.84
GBR
IRL
21,788
-45.97
-0.78
IRL
GBR
19,420
-45.94
-0.43
GBR
JPN
6,277
-13.05
2.25
JPN
GBR
13,243
-13.07
-1.95
GBR
CHN
9,545
-27.56
2.04
CHN
GBR
48,619
-27.57
-3.21
Table 6: Change in Great Britain's trading relationships. Source: ifo Institut. GBR:
Great Britain, CAN: Canada, GER: Germany, FRA: France, ITA: Italy, ESP:
Spain, IRL: Ireland, JPN: Japan, CHN: China.
C.

EFFECTS IN NORTH AMERICA

Table 7 examines the changes in trade in North America and between
the United States and the BRICS. A few important insights are striking.
First, TTIP leads to trade diversion effects within the North American

Free Trade Area (NAFTA) between the United States, Mexico, and Canada. In the comprehensive liberalization scenario, both exports and imports decline for NAFTA partner countries within the region. The two
NAFTA countries whose position is not improved by TTIP, Mexico and
Canada, intensify their trade. That is an impressive example of trade diversion effects between countries not directly affected in any way by
TTIP: the access of these countries especially to the U.S. market becomes
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less attractive due to increased competition from the EU, leading to a
substantial rise in trade between them. What makes this effect so strong
is that the trade barriers, as we know, between Mexico and Canada have
already been eliminated.
Interestingly, TTIP leads to an expansion of trade between the EU and
Canada. Geographic circumstances are decisive for this result. Because
of its closeness to the United States, Canada is especially affected by
trade diversion effects involving the United States. This effect leads to
creating trade with the EU member countries that are geographically farther away, so that transport costs are lower, and the change in the relative
cost structures leads to replacement of the American market with the
EU. This circumstance means that finalization of an agreement between
the EU and Canada, currently under negotiation, would strengthen the
trade of the countries involved with each other but not eliminate the negative trade diversion effects.
Exporter

Importer

2010 Trade volumes
(in USD millions)

Comprehensive
liberalization %

Tariff
scenario %

EU
CAN

CAN
EU

43,565
34,965

14.53
10.07

2.82
0.00

USA
MEX

MEX
USA

142,763
221,803

-15.99
-16.04

-0.82
1.33

USA
CAN

CAN
USA

193,554
271,268

-9.32
-9.32

-0.55
1.61

MEX
CAN

CAN
MEX

18,965
6,692

83.53
83.63

3.10
3.11

USA
BRA

BRA
USA

26,762
20,116

-29.45
-29.72

-0.95
-2.24

USA
RUS

RUS
USA

7,878
16,674

-29.40
-29.16

-1.69
0.28

USA
IND

IND
USA

15,174
29,214

-30.51
-30.75

-0.99
-0.84

USA
CHN

CHN
USA

83,873
327,554

-33.35
-33.38

-1.16
-1.50

USA
SAF

SAF
USA

5,993
8,331

-26.69
-26.53

-2.07
0.27

139,681
401,889

-31.78
-32.69

-1.17
-1.38

USA
BRICS

BRICS
USA

Table 7: Change in trade between the United States and Canada. Source: ifo
Institut. EU: European Union, CAN: Canada, MEX: Mexico, BRA: Brazil, RUS:
Russia, IND: India, CHN: China, SAF: South Africa.

V.

HOW DO REAL PER CAPITA INCOMES CHANGE?

The TTIP effects on trade flows presented thus far essentially result, as
has already been pointed out above, from the adaptation of trade costs
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and the resulting change in production costs, input prices, and income
positions of the countries.
A.

EFFECTS IN THE

EU

What are the effects of eliminating the transatlantic trade barriers on
real per capita income in the EU? Does TTIP result in greater discrepancies in living conditions in Europe or does it promote convergence? To
answer this question, we first look at the unambitious tariff scenario and
then describe the effects of deep liberalization.
1.

Tariff Scenario

The model simulations now show that a transatlantic free-trade agreement would not contribute to causing greater divergence in living conditions in Europe. In fact, the opposite is more likely. Figure 3 shows the
change in real per capita income (which is identical to real GDP per capita) in all EU Member Countries if tariffs between the EU and the
United States are entirely eliminated.
The change in real per capita income ranges between 0.03 percent
(Luxemburg) and 0.58 percent (Lithuania). For Germany, the value is
0.24 percent. In the non-weighted EU27 mean, the gain is 0.27 percent
and the standard deviation is 0.13 percent. These effects are small because the tariffs that still exist between the EU and the United States are
already low (the weighted average is 2.8 percent).

Figure 3: Change in real per capita income in the EU-27, tariff scenario. Source:
ifo Institut.
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The illustration above makes the following points clear: First, all member countries of the EU benefit from trade liberalization. In the tariff
scenario, that was not necessarily the case because the EU had to give up
tariff revenues. That means, in the tariff scenario, less income is available
for distribution. 20 Second, how much economies benefit depends on the
real trade structure of the individual countries, their size, and their geographical position. Those that export a relatively large amount obtain
relatively higher gains. This accounts for the somewhat higher benefits in
Great Britain, for example. Higher incomes in these countries again result in increased demand for goods from other countries in the EU. How
these effects are distributed in Europe depends essentially on inner European transport routes and thus the geographical location of the countries.
Finally, it also turns out that smaller countries tend to gain more than
large ones. The example of the Baltic countries is especially telling in this
regard. Smaller countries are more involved in the international division
of labor and therefore gain more from lower trade costs. The effects illustrated include these aspects.
Figure 4 correlates per capita growth with the level of real per capita
GDP for 2011. The cloud diagram shows a negative correlation that is
also confirmed by statistical analysis. The line is a linear regression equation. It can be read as follows: the log of French per capita income is
about 10.5. The statistical model forecasts an increase in real per capita
GDP for this country of 0.23 percent (which is higher than the specific
calculations for France or 0.17 percent; i.e., France profits below average). For a country with a 50 percent lower per capita income than
France (such as Poland or Hungary, for example, where the log of per
capita income is about 10.0), the statistical model forecasts growth of 0.33
percent. 21 This shows that the transatlantic agreement would contribute
to convergence in Europe: countries that currently have a lower per capita income (such as Romania) gain more than those that have higher incomes (such as Luxembourg). There is a large degree of scatter, but the
statistical finding is unambiguous.

20. It is assumed that the tariffs revenue of the EU is distributed uniformly to all EU
countries. That is not actually the case, but all tariff revenues from trade with the
United States account for less than 0.1 percent of EU GDP so that a substantial
distortion of the result is not likely.
21. The coefficient of the log of per capita income for 2011 in the regression equation
is -0.21; the relevant standard deviation is -0.05. Thus the correlation is statistically
significant at the 1 percent level. This finding does not depend on the data
weighting.
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Figure 4: Trade gains and status quo per capita income, tariff scenario. Line shows
linear regression. Source and calculations: ifo Institut.

2.

Deep Liberalization

If we move from the tariff scenario to an ambitious scenario that besides eliminating tariffs, also includes a reduction of non-tariff barriers,
the resulting picture is different. As also explained above, it is important
to realize here that the deep scenario, in addition to trade-policy liberalization steps, also includes induced effects (e.g., from the expansion of
direct investments or the reduction of economic policy uncertainty).
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Figure 5: Change in real per capita income in the EU27, deep liberalization.
Wohlfahrtsainderung:Welfare Change. Source: ifo Institut.

Figure 5 reproduces Figure 1 for the case of a deep agreement. On
average, the gains are some twenty-three times higher than in the tariff
scenario. Most striking is the deviation in Luxembourg, which profits a
great deal from increased trading by its European trading partners with
the United States without having large trade flows with America itself.
Germany also shows gains that are twenty times higher than in the tariff
scenario. The European average gain is 4.95 percent with a standard
deviation of 1.58 percent. One country that benefits relatively little is
France (2.64 percent). The reason is that France has relatively little trade
in goods with the United States. Even so, the gains are in the clearly
visible range.
The countries that profit most are generally those that already have
high relative trade volumes with the United States. This explains the
large gain by Great Britain. The Scandinavian countries and Spain also
get above average gains. But in the latter instance, it is due to the fact
that Spain replaces relatively expensive European imports with imports
from the United States, which has a welfare-increasing effect.
Figure 5 suggests that above all, the smaller peripheral countries obtain
above average gains from trade liberalization. The reason for this is the
same as in the tariff scenario. But with the non-tariff barriers eliminated,
the stimulation of inner-European demand from supplier relationships
with large countries that obtain relatively strong benefits plays a substantially larger role.
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Figure 6 again correlates the projected growth in per capita income
with its current level. Again, the correlation is negative. The minus sign is
driven entirely by Luxembourg, however. With or without Luxembourg,
no statistically significant connection between the two values can be
demonstrated. 22
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Figure 6: Trade gains and status quo per capita income, deep liberalization. Line
shows linear regression. Source: ifo Institut.

VI.

CONCLUSION

It can be concluded that the transatlantic free trade initiative does not
expand the income gap within Europe. The modest tariff scenario actually shows that the agreement leads to more convergence: i.e., the poorer,
often peripheral countries profit more than the richer, central ones. But
in such a scenario, the average gains from the agreement are low. An
agreement that also significantly lowers non-tariff barriers leads to much
higher welfare gains. Also in this case, there is a negative correlation
between the status quo income of EU Member States and their gains, so
that additional convergence results. But the correlation here is not a reliable one under the usual statistical assumptions.

22. The regression coefficient of the log of per capita income in 2011 amounts to -0.80
for a standard deviation of the same size.
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EFFECTS ON THE UNITED STATES AND THIRD COUNTRIES

One central point of criticism in the debate about any free-trade agreement involves its effect on third countries. If a few countries tear down
the trade barriers among them but maintain tariff and non-tariff barriers
against countries outside the agreement, there is trade creation that supports welfare among the partners but at the same time, trade with third
parties is diverted. In the tariff scenario, it can, in theory, actually lead to
the partner countries obtaining absolutely no benefit from the agreement:
the lost tariff income is larger (in monetary terms) than the advantages of
improved market access. And typically, those countries that do not participate in the agreement lose. In fact, it is even theoretically possible for
real global total income to fall, if the gains obtained by participants in the
agreement are smaller than the losses of those who remain outside.
The effects of lower non-tariff barriers are different than those of lower
tariffs. There are several reasons for this: Tariffs distribute income-essentially from consumers to producers. Their harmful side effect is how
they distort consumption and production decisions. This causes damage
to the economy that rises to the square of the tariffs, but when the tariffs
are very low (close to zero), they are negligible. Non-tariff barriers do
not result in any income distribution; instead they generate direct economic costs. To make products fit for a foreign market, bureaucratic, regulatory, and administrative rules have to be respected, delays occur and
the market risk rises. These costs are associated with the use of resources
but are of very little or no use to the consumer. In this way, even very
small non-tariff barriers reduce the purchasing power of consumers and
thus their real income.
An additional difference between tariff and non-tariff barriers is important in this connection. Non-tariff barriers assume various forms, but
one important way to liberalize them is to unify product standards or
allow automatic domestic acceptance of products that are allowed for use
abroad. That can also assist third countries: if a product satisfies the standards of one member country in a free trade zone, it may then be allowed
for sale in all countries of the zone, even if it comes from a third country.
With the adoption of standards, third countries can minimize the trade
diversion effects that are harmful to them.
In order to quantify the global effects, we refer to the model used in
the previous section. This model was calibrated and simulated for 126
countries, so that it can be used for analyzing the effects. First let us turn
to the tariff scenario.
1. Tariff Scenario
Figure 7 shows the change in real per capita income in all countries
considered. The model covers virtually all the countries of the world, except for some gaps mainly in Africa. Countries that profit from the transatlantic agreement are shown in blue, while those that lose from it are
shown in red. One country colored dark blue is the United States. There,
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real per capita income rises by 0.8 percent just from lowering tariffs.
Compared to other countries, the total trade barriers of the United States
are relatively low. That low barrier is due to language, currency, and a
general policy of openness to foreign trade, and the result is that tariff
cuts can have a strong positive effect.
The figure shows that the winners in the free trade zone are essentially
limited to the United States and EU Member States. Other than those,
there are only isolated countries in which the average real income rises.
These are countries that benefit disproportionately from additional exports because of an improved economy in the EU or the United States.
Examples are Brazil, Kazakhstan, and Indonesia, which are important
suppliers of raw materials to Europe and the United States. These countries produce goods like natural gas or cotton for which there are very
few good substitutes. Interestingly, the gains for Kazakhstan or Brazil
are higher than the average real income gains in Europe. That gain
shows that the complicated international interweaving of the flow of
goods can also result in surprising effects. Countries like Norway or Japan see no noticeable changes in their per capita income.

Figure 7: Change in global real per capita income, tariff scenario. Wohlfahrtsdnderung: Welfare Change. Source: ifo Institut.

The main losers from eliminating tariffs are the developing countries.
They experience dramatic losses in market share from intensified competition on the EU or U.S. markets. Alternative markets with similar market potential are geographically far apart. This is a problem especially for
countries in North and West Africa, which traditionally trade intensively
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with Europe, especially France and Belgium. The list of losers is led by
Ivory Coast and Guinea. Their exports to Europe are pushed out by
goods from the United States. East Africa comes out a little better,
mainly due to its proximity to other large markets like China or Australia/
New Zealand. But there too, significant losses can be experienced by
countries such as Uganda and Tanzania.
Overall, it shows what was to be feared: if tariffs between the United
States and the EU fall, the relative barriers to market entry faced by developing countries become on average higher. It is exactly the poorer
countries that suffer, some of them to a remarkable extent. Europe and
the United States would have to moderate these negative effects through
the quick signing of a "Doha light" compromise. The resources for doing
so are already available in principle; through the EU-U.S. agreement, despite losses in many third countries, the world becomes on average richer
by some 0.1 percent.
2.

Deep Liberalization

Finally, let us take a look at the effects of deep liberalization between
the EU and the United States. Its trade-creating effects are, as described
in the EU27 example, several orders of magnitude greater than those created only by eliminating tariffs, which necessarily means that the trade
diversion effects are also more intense. The trend is for countries that
remain outside to lose even more significantly. All the same, it is clear
that the stronger recovery in the transatlantic economy can also make the
demand effect in third countries even more pronounced.
Figure 8 shows the calculated effects. As in the simulations already
discussed, this is an "all other things being equal" effect, i.e., it includes
only those effects that can be traced back to the transatlantic agreement.
In the case of non-tariff barriers, however, it is very likely that many
countries, especially the traditional trading partners of the EU and the
United States, will adopt the same standards and regulations. Under certain circumstances, it is even realistic for countries that already have freetrade agreements with the EU or the United States to indirectly participate in negotiations between the EU and the United States, so that their
concerns are taken into account. This does not show up in the calculations, so the negative welfare effects may be exaggerated. They do
clearly reflect the trend, however, and indicate where there is a need to
act.
It is even more obvious than in the tariff scenario that the traditional
trading partners of Europe and the United States are hurt by the agreement. The losses that would be experienced by Canada, Mexico, Japan,
Australia, Chile, or Norway are substantial in this scenario. These countries are highly motivated to imitate the elimination of non-tariff barriers
between the EU and the United States or improve their partially existing
bilateral agreements with the United States and EU, or to enter into such
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agreements. There are many signs that exactly such efforts are now
underway.
For the world in general, deep liberalization between the EU and the
United States means a rise in average real income of 3.27 percent. That
increase puts enough money on the table to compensate the losers. It can
be hoped that the agreement increases the willingness of developing and
emerging countries to enter into compromises in the Doha Development
Agenda. At the same time, the industrial countries should also be ready
to make compromises because a substantial intensification of the economic relationships between the United States and EU would make the
necessary resources available.

Figure 8: Change in global real per capita income, deep liberalization. Wohlfahrtsanderung:Welfare Change. Source: ifo Institut.

VII.

What Happens in the Labor Markets?

While the previous section of the study illuminated the trade and welfare effects of both scenarios, and the labor market effects were intentionally abstracted, the following section devotes its attention to the
decidedly aggregated employment effects of eliminating tariffs as well as
of a deep liberalization scenario. For this, the methodology of our structural model of foreign trade must be expanded with an explicit model for
the labor markets in the countries affected.
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SEARCH UNEMPLOYMENT AND FOREIGN TRADE

The model used so far does not explicitly model the effects on the labor
market because it was developed in order to analyze trade flows. In the
academic literature about evaluating trade liberalization efforts, there is a
long tradition of refraining from explicit modeling of the labor market.
One reason may be the long lack of a generally accepted model for labor
markets and their underlying institutions and frictions. But when Christopher Pissarides, Dale Mortensen, and Peter Diamond were honored
with the 2010 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for their ground-breaking insights in modeling search unemployment, 23 a larger segment of the
public finally realized that a generally accepted model has been found.
What differentiates such models is that they depart from the assumption
applied in classical economics that the wages of workers adapt as long as
it takes for all those seeking work to have a job offered by a company. 24
Obviously, this assumption contradicts the empirical fact of the existence
of involuntary unemployment. Instead, these models assume that the unemployed first have to look for vacant positions and only find a job with a
degree of probability. Likewise, employers must assume costs in order to
find an employee. These costs range from the costs of an ad in a newspaper or on-line platform to the assessment centers, selection interviews,
and hiring and training costs that new employees generate. A company's
unfilled positions are likewise only filled with a degree of probability.
These frictions associated with the search lead to search (or frictional)
unemployment; even during an economic boom, there will always be a
certain number of unemployed who continue to look for a job. Moreover,
labor market institutions naturally affect the unemployment rate. If a
country has a good employment agency, more unemployed will find jobs
and unemployment will be lower. And wage replacement payments such
as unemployment benefits have an influence on the unemployment rate.
A major advantage of this modeling approach is that all these labor market institutions can be reproduced within the model framework. Moreover, the model explains the simultaneous existence of job openings and
unemployed people.
Recent globalization research has taken advantage of these modeling
approaches, in order to introduce them into existing approaches to theoretical modeling of trade flows between countries. Among the pioneers
in this area were Davidson and Matusz. 25 The most recent contributions

23. Nobel Prizes and Laureates, NOBILPRIZE.ORG, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel

prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2010/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2013).
24. For an introduction to these models, see CIRISTOPIIER PISSARIDES, EQuilu13RIUM
(2d ed. 2000).
UNEMPLOYMENI TtiiY

25. See Carl Davidson, Martin Lawrence, & Steven Matusz, Trade and Search Generated Unemployment, 48 J. lr.. ECON. 271 (1999).
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in this field are by Helpman and Itskhoki 26 as well as Felbermayr. 27 Heid
and Larch 28 have taken up these theoretical studies and made them accessible to empirical quantitative analysis. 2 9 At the core, this empirical
structural model consists of an expansion of the models we used to analyze trade flows for the tariff and TTIP scenarios in the previous sections
of the study for explicit modeling of the labor market. The results that
follow are based specifically on this methodological approach. Given
their extensive similarity, there will be only a short discussion of the
adapted methodology in the pages that follow.
The empirical strategy is analogous to the previous one: we set the
model using the observed data in such a way that the trade flows observed in the base scenario are replicated in the expected value. The difference is that we now set the model explicitly for the observed
unemployment rates. Moreover, we take into account the fact that in
different countries, there are different incentives to taking a job, which
result from differences in wage replacement payments (the average unemployment benefits, measured as a percentage of the average wage). 30
Then we analyze the effects of the tariff and deep liberalization scenarios.
Now, however, we can explicitly investigate the net employment effects
of these scenarios and calculate the firm number of jobs that are created
or lost. Moreover, we can also observe the change in real wages.
From this sketch of the methodology it becomes clear that while the
analysis framework now allows explicit investigation of the labor market,
it is bought at the price of a substantially higher requirement for data.
We additionally need comparable information on unemployment rates,
employment levels, and the wage replacement payments. Concretely, we
use the labor market data from 2010; the wage replacement rates are
however from 2009, because they are compiled only every two years.
These rates are unfortunately available only for a data set of twenty-eight
OECD countries.3 1 Being limited to these industrialized countries guar26. See Elhanan Helpman & Oleg Itskhoki, Labour Market Rigidities, Trade and Unemployment, 77 Riv. ECON. S'TUD. 1100 (2010).
27. See Gabriel Felbermayr, et al., Globalizationand Labor Market Outcomes: Wage
Bargaining, Search Frictions, and Firm Heterogeneity, 146 J. ECON. TI IEORY 39
(2011).
28. See Benedikt Heid & Mario Larch, International Trade and Unemployment: A
QuantitativeFramework (CESifo Working Paper No. 4013, 2013) available at http:/
/www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/working-papers/CESifoWP/
CESifoWPdetails?wp-num=4013&CESifoWP.search=+.
29. See id. for a complete overview of the literature and an exact description of the
model framework used.
30. Calculation of wage replacement payments is more complicated than described
here. We are using OECD data that calculates an average wage replacement rate
from a combination of different life situations of workers (family status, number of
children, etc.). These figures provide a good approximation of the average level of
unemployment benefits for a cross-section of countries. Benefits and Wages:
OECD Indicators,ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AN) DEVEILOPMENT, http://www.oecd.org/els/benefitsandwagesoecdindicators.htm (last visited
Sept. 18, 2013).
31. The countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
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antees that the labor markets are comparable, at least to the extent that
other factors, such as informal employment or subsistence farming, as are
common in Latin America, Africa, and large parts of Asia, for example,
do not distort the analysis. A representation of the labor market structures of these countries is unfortunately not possible, given the (lack of)
available data.
Table 8 shows the unemployment rates used. In the data for 2010, the
effects of the continuing financial, government debt, and euro crisis are
quite evident: Spain had the highest unemployment in the OECD at 20
percent; Germany, in the European comparison, had a relatively low unemployment rate of 7.46 percent; and the unemployment rate in the
United States, at just below 10 percent, reached a historical peak.
Country
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Slovakia
South Korea
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States

2010 unemployment rate in percent
5.23
4.39
8.29
8.01
7.28
7.46
8.40
9.36
7.06
12.53
11.16
7.56
13.64
8.42
5.03
4.45
6.53
3.61
9.62
10.79
14.37
3.72
20.06
8.37
4.54
11.88
7.75
9.63

Table 8: 2010 unemployment rates. Source: OECD Labour Force
Statistics (2010)32
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, South Korea,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
32. Labour Force Statistics, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-oPERATION ANI)
(Jan. 2011), http://www.oecd.org/std/labour-stats/labourforce
DEVELOPMENT
statisticsl989-20092010editionoecd.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2013).
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To ensure the comparability of the results with those in the previous
section, despite having fewer countries covered, we considered, when
parameterizing the model that grosso modo, the same aggregated trade
creation effects between the EU and the United States are achieved in
both scenarios as in the model with the 126 countries without taking labor
market frictions into account.
B.

Two

MILLION NEW JOBS

What effect does elimination of the trade barriers in transatlantic trade
have on the unemployment rate? How many jobs are created? And how
do real wages change? To answer these questions, we consider first the
unambitious tariff scenario, and afterwards describe the effects of a deep
liberalization. At this point we would like to point out that our model has
intentionally removed the economy-induced changes in the unemployment rate and only investigates the long-term or accumulated effects of
trade liberalization on the unemployment rate, meaning that the numbers
presented below are to be considered long-term results or equivalent to
changes in employment independent of the economic cycle. That means,
for example, that a 1 percentage point drop in the unemployment rate
reduces the unemployment rate during both an upswing and a downswing
of the economy by 1 percent.
1. Tariff Scenario
Table 9 shows the results of eliminating the existing tariffs. The second
column shows the percentage change in employment. Inversely, Column
3 shows the changes in the unemployment rate. But this is the change in
percentage points. Concretely, this means that the tariff elimination
would lower the unemployment rate in Germany by 0.11 percentage
points. It becomes clear that employment rises in all EU countries as
well as the United States. But the changes are very small and the EU
states range around 0.1 percentage points. An exception is the United
Kingdom, which, because of its special closeness to the United States
based on language and culture, as mentioned above, profits in particular
with a reduction of its unemployment rate by 0.34 percentage points. On
the other hand, in the countries that do not gain from tariff reduction,
unemployment rises slightly. This can be explained by relatively higher
trade costs between these countries and the EU and United States. These
relatively higher trade costs lead to a smaller trading volume, i.e., less
demand for products from these countries, which reduces production in
the affected countries. This weakened demand translates directly into a
lower employment demand from companies in the affected countries,
which leads to increased unemployment. Conversely, the now relatively
lower trade costs in the United States and EU mean greater demand for
goods from the EU and United States, which translates into new hires,
and ultimately into a lower unemployment rate.
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When we weigh the individual changes with the gross domestic product, there is a reduction in the unemployment rates in the twenty-eight
countries of 0.11 percentage points.
In a trade model without aggregated employment effects, all adaptations occur in prices and wages. In our model framework, a portion of
these effects is diverted into quantities, i.e., employment effects; but even
in this model framework, they also result in changes in (real) wages. Real
wages in this model framework are also an adequate measurement of
welfare. Here we see that in Germany, real wages rise 0.54 percent, and
in the United States, 0.93 percent. Here, too, the United Kingdom profits
most with a real wage increase of 1.72 percent. The countries not affected
by the tariff reduction must, on the other hand, accept smaller real wage
cuts. Overall, however, real wages rise 0.59 percent in the OECD, so that
even considering aggregated unemployment effects, enough profits are
achieved in principle to offset the disadvantaged countries through transfer payments, for example.
Even with consideration of the employment effects, it appears that the
total effects of only tariff elimination are very slight, and compared to the
economic fluctuations of the unemployment rate, should be considered
negligible.
Figure 10 finally offers some insight into the effects of the tariff reduction on convergence within the EU. It shows on the x-axis the unemployment rates in 2010, and on the y-axis, the reduction of unemployment
rates through tariff reduction. It is immediately clear that in all EU member countries, the unemployment rate sinks, i.e., all countries profit directly from a revival of their employment markets. The straight line
drawn is a regression line, and it shows a positive rise.3 3 This should be
interpreted as follows: the higher the unemployment rate in an EU member country, the greater the reduction of the unemployment rate from
tariff reduction. This means that tariff elimination contributes to a convergence of the labor market situation within the EU: the countries with
the most precarious labor market situations profit most. The graph shows
the exceptional situation of the United Kingdom, which, despite its relatively low unemployment rate, benefits the most.

33. The increase coefficent is not significant of 0 different based on the United Kingdom outlier. A regression line without that outlier is at the 5% significance level
of 0 different and also shows a clearly positive rise.
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Percentage rise Change in unemployment Percentage change
Country
in employment
rate in percentage points
in real wages
Australia
-0.12
0.11
-0.56
Austria
0.07
-0.07
0.32
Belgium
0.02
-0.02
0.09
Canada
-0.15
0.15
-0.71
Czech Republic
0.11
-0.10
0.53
Denmark
0.13
-0.12
0.63
Finland
-0.19
0.21
0.97
France
0.12
-0.11
-0.54
Germany
0.12
-0.11
0.54
Greece
0.20
-0.17
0.93
Hungary
0.15
-0.13
0.70
Iceland
-0.12
0.11
-0.56
Ireland
0.24
-0.21
1.14
Italy
0.16
-0.15
0.72
Japan
-0.03
0.03
-0.14
Netherlands
0.09
-0.08
0.40
New Zealand
-0.08
0.07
-0.37
Norway
-0.12
0.12
-0.55
Poland
0.15
-0.13
0.69
Portugal
0.22
-0.19
1.02
Slovakia
0.14
-0.12
0.66
South Korea
-0.03
0.03
-0.15
Spain
0.20
-0.16
0.92
Sweden
0.18
-0.16
0.85
Switzerland
-0.11
0.10
-0.50
Turkey
-0.11
0.10
-0.51
United Kingdom
0.37
-0.34
1.72
United States
0.20
-0.18
0.93
Average
(GDP-weighted)
0.13
-0.11
0.59
Table 9: Change in employment, unemployment rates and real wages, tariff scenario.
Calculations by ifo Institut.
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Figure 9: Reduction of the unemployment rate and 2010 unemployment rate, tariff
scenario. Line shows linear regression. Calculations by ifo Institut.

2.

Deep Liberalization

Let us now look at the deep liberalization scenario. Table 10 reports
the corresponding results. It is immediately clear that the effects for EU
countries are about four times as large as in the tariff reduction scenario.
For example, in Germany the unemployment rate drops by 0.43 percentage points, which corresponds to an increase in employment of 0.47 percent. In the United States, the decline in unemployment is 0.71
percentage points, and in the United Kingdom, even 1.27 percentage
points.

Countries affected by the bank and government debt crisis also do especially well: unemployment in Spain drops 0.62 percentage points, in
Greece and Portugal, by about 0.7 percentage points, and in Ireland, even
by 0.84 percentage points. The effect for Ireland, despite the common
language with the United States, is smaller than in the United Kingdom,
due to the relatively marginal position of Ireland in comparison to the
United Kingdom.
Even with consideration of the quantitative (or employment) effects,
the impact on prices, here real wages, and thus on consumer welfare, is
substantially larger: In Germany, real wages are 2.19 percent higher, and
in the countries severely affected by the crisis just mentioned, at least 3
percent higher. It is thus apparent that deep liberalization, besides providing higher positive employment effects, offers substantially higher welfare effects than does just eliminating tariffs. But there are also losers in
this scenario within the OECD: they are those countries that are not part
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of the TTIP agreement. But even in their case, on average, the real
GDP-weighted wage increase is 2.34 percent, so that there are sufficient
profits available for the third countries that don't participate to be able to
be compensated for their real wage losses. On average, the OECD unemployment rate falls by 0.45 percentage points.
This is especially remarkable: the implementation of TTIP is, thus, not
a zero-sum game, however it generates real welfare gains from the elimination of real trade costs, so that (in principle) all countries can benefit
from this reduction.
The underlying mechanism is the same as in the tariff scenario: the increase in export demand triggered by the reduction of trade costs leads to
more hiring by companies, which directly causes the unemployment rate
to fall. At the same time, this causes consumption of goods to rise domestically, based on the higher number of people working, which again
causes more demand for imports from other TTIP member countries.
These positive spillover effects in the general equilibrium with consideration for trade intertwining between countries reinforce the pure reduction
of trade costs.
Figure 11, analogous to Figure 10, provides a clear description of the
convergence between EU member countries: the graphs look very similar, however the values on the y-axis are much higher. It is also evident
here that the higher the unemployment rate in an EU member country
before TTIP, the lower it will be after implementation of a deep TTIP
agreement. 34

34. The slope coefficient for this graph is likewise not significant from 0 different because of the United Kingdom outlier. A regression line without this outlier is at
the 5 percent significance level of 0 different and also shows a clear positive slope.
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Percentage rise
in employment

Change in unemployment
rate in percentage points

Percentage change
in real wages

-2.14
0.44
-0.47
Australia
1.33
0.28
-0.27
Austria
0.42
-0.08
0.09
Belgium
-2.75
0.56
-0.60
Canada
2.14
-0.42
0.46
Czech Republic
2.54
0.54
-0.50
Denmark
3.84
0.81
-0.75
Finland
2.22
-0.43
0.47
France
2.19
-0.43
0.47
Germany
3.68
-0.68
0.78
Greece
2.81
0.60
-0.53
Hungary
-2.12
0.42
-0.46
Iceland
4.61
-0.84
0.97
Ireland
2.90
-0.57
0.62
Italy
-0.53
0.11
-0.11
Japan
1.65
-0.34
0.35
Netherlands
-1.40
0.28
New Zealand
-0.30
-2.12
0.44
-0.46
Norway
2.75
-0.53
0.58
Poland
4.03
-0.76
Portugal
0.85
2.63
-0.48
Slovakia
0.56
-0.58
0.12
South Korea
-0.13
3.65
-0.62
Spain
0.78
3.37
-0.65
0.72
Sweden
-1.96
0.41
-0.43
Switzerland
-1.94
0.38
-0.42
Turkey
6.60
-1.27
1.38
United Kingdom
3.68
-0.71
0.78
United States
Average
2.34
-0.45
0.50
(GDP-weighted)
deep
liberalization.
wages,
real
rate
and
unemployment
employment,
in
Table 10: Change
Source: ifo Institut.
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Figure 10: Drop in the unemployment rate and the 2010 unemployment rate, deep
liberalization. Line shows linear regression. Calculations by ifo Institut.
VIII.

CONCLUSION-TWO MILLION JOBS WITH
DEEP LIBERALIZATION

Generally, the view expressed in the previous analyses is confirmed:
while a pure tariff elimination would have positive welfare and employment effects for the EU and United States, the positive effects of deep
liberalization are many times greater. It is also clear that any fears about
EU countries drifting farther apart as a result of the liberalization efforts
are unfounded; on the contrary, the agreement contributes toward harmonizing the labor market situations and living conditions within the EU.
This emphasizes the special significance of a comprehensive liberalization
in giving a detectible stimulus to the economies on both sides of the
Atlantic.
Finally, in Table 11 we provide an overview of the net additional jobs
created in both scenarios in the OECD, i.e., conversion of the changes in
the unemployment rate into jobs. A deep liberalization will create about
181,000 new jobs in Germany, and more than a million in the United
States. The total amount shows a growth in employment in all OECD
countries of more than two million jobs; in the less ambitious tariff scenario, about half a million. These numbers make it especially clear that the
deep liberalization generates important employment stimuli. It should
also be considered, in this context, that positive spillover effects based on
psychological factors (boom mood after comprehensive liberalization)
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were not included in our modeling. It is probable that these effects would
make the figures even more positive.
Deep

Tariff

liberalization
-52,332
11,638
4,062
-101,854
22,278
14,623
20,066
121,566
181,092
34,277
22,613
-769
18,115
140,979

scenario
-13,591
2,828
873
-26,176
5,527
3,646
5,134
29,921
44,831
8,766
5,691
-201
4,549
35,538

Japan

-71,833

-19,030

Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway

29,535
-6,606
-11,541

7,121
-1,748
-3,001

Poland

93,333

23,466

Country
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy

42,521
Portugal
12,995
Slovakia
-29,841
South Korea
143,098
Spain
32,515
Sweden
-18,224
Switzerland
-94,831
Turkey
400,203
United Kingdom
1,085,501
United States
2,043,178
Jobs created in the OECD
Table 11: Number of jobs created in both scenarios. Source: ifo Institut.
IV.

10,878
3,259
-7,912
36,457
8,241
-4,640
-24,625
106,134
276,623
518,558

SUMMARY

In this study, we examined the macroeconomic effects of a transatlantic
trade and investment partnership (ITIP) between the EU and THE
United States. Two scenarios were examined: (i) the elimination of tariffs
in transatlantic trade; and (ii) a deep, comprehensive liberalization of
trade, in which regulatory barriers to market access are also reduced. To
do so, an empirical approach was chosen that applies to the agreement of
those trade-creating effects that can be measured in comparable, already

existing free-trade agreements. By doing so, the direct quantification of
non-tariff trade barriers, and speculation about their removal as part of
the agreement, can be avoided.
The most important results can be summarized as follows:
1. Trade between the United States and Germany is not significantly
strengthened by eliminating tariffs. Reduction of non-tariff barri-

2013]

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

TRANSATLANTIC FREE TRADE

481

ers above and beyond tariffs as part of a comprehensive liberalization scenario has much bigger effects. The growth to be expected
is in the 90 percent range.
For other EU countries, trade growth of a similar scale can be
expected. In all cases, it was true that growth from simply eliminating tariffs is negligible.
Germany's trade with its traditional trade partners in Europe declines sharply in some areas in the comprehensive scenario (e.g.,
with France: -23 percent). This is due to the reversal of the trade
diversion caused in the European Customs Union and domestic
market. Similar effects exist also for the other EU countries, for
example for Great Britain. The trade policy intertwining of EU
countries among themselves declines.
Germany's trade with the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India,
China, South Africa) would drop, because of the comprehensive
agreement, by about 10 percent relative to the initial equilibrium.
Given the massive expansion of transatlantic trade, this is a slight
effect. U.S. trade with the BRICS countries would however decline
more sharply (30 percent).
EU trade with neighboring states in North Africa or Eastern Europe would decline by an average of 5 percent from the comprehensive agreement. This results from the circumstance that the
TTIP partially devalues existing preference agreements.
A free-trade agreement between the United States and EU has
important welfare effects on the countries directly involved, and
on countries that are only indirectly affected by the agreement.
Within the EU, as well, there are differences cutting across the
countries. Within Europe, the Baltic States benefit most from
eliminating tariffs in trade with the United States. Relatively high
gains arise also in Great Britain and in the countries bordering the
Mediterranean. Germany can expect an increase in real, per capita income of 0.24 percent. Located at the other end are France,
the Benelux countries, and Austria, with its neighbors. The average is 0.27 percent.
Reducing non-tariff barriers clearly has greater effects on real, per
capita incomes in Europe than just eliminating tariffs. It now can
be seen that Great Britain would especially benefit from the initiative (growth of 9.70 percent). The Scandinavian member states,
the Baltic countries, and Spain see above-average increases. Germany profits are at 4.68 percent, a bit less than the average, which
is 4.95 percent. France, with 2.64 percent, gains relatively little in
comparison.
Dropping transatlantic tariffs to zero gives the most help to the
poorer EU member countries. Member states whose per capita
income in 2011 was 50 percent below that of France could expect
welfare gains that are about 0.1 percent higher than those of
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9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

France. In the case of reducing the non-tariff barriers, no convergence effect can be statistically proven.
The United States gains substantially more than the EU. In the
tariff scenario, the real per capita income rises about 0.8 percent;
in a deep liberalization of non-tariff barriers, the gains rise to
about 13.4 percent. These high gains result from the fact of already low trade barriers with the large European countries, like
Great Britain, but also Germany.
Liberalization of trade between the EU and the United States
leads to trade creation between the partners, however also to evident trade diversion in trade with third countries. With pure tariff
elimination, the countries of West Africa, which traditionally
trade a lot with Europe, lose up to about 7 percent. But there are
also winners among the third countries: Brazil, Kazakhstan, and
Indonesia have higher percentage gains than Europe from positive, indirect effects. Welfare rises by about 0.1 percent.
If the non-tariff barriers between EU and the United States are
liberalized in addition to the tariffs, the per capita income in a
global average rises a good 3.27 percent. The trade diversion effects are, in comparison to the customs scenario, only insignificantly larger, however distributed among third countries in a
different way. Now the traditional trading partners of the United
States, such as Mexico, Canada, and Chile experience substantial
losses; likewise Australia, Japan, and Israel each lose between 9.5
and 5.5 percent. These countries, therefore, have strong incentives to participate in negotiating the liberalization of non-tariff
barriers.
If search unemployment is considered in the model calculations, it
appears possible-at least for data reasons only for the OECD
countries-that TTIP leads to a rise in employment and a decline
in unemployment in the United States, EU, and, on average, all
OECD states. In the tariff scenario, the effects are small; with
comprehensive liberalization, they are noticeably larger. In the
OECD average, the unemployment rate falls by about 0.5 percentage points.
TTIP leads, in some countries, to job losses. In the ambitious scenario, these amount to up to 100,000 jobs (in Canada). In the
OECD average, however, a total of 2 million additionaljobs are
created. Even in the tariff scenario, the growth in jobs amounts to
half a million jobs.
Real wages in the directly affected countries rise on average; in
the OECD average, through a deep TTIP, they rise by about 2.3
percent, with the growth in Great Britain, Ireland, or the United
States, higher than, for example, in Germany.
In countries where the unemployment rate in the initial equilibrium is higher than average, TTIP leads to an above-average de-
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cline in unemployment. This applies both to a simple lowering of
tariffs, as well as to deep liberalization. TTIP therefore also leads
to convergence on the labor markets within the OECD.
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